As is well-known, aggregate health expenditures as a share of GDP have risen in the United States from about 5 percent in 1960 to nearly 15 percent in recent years. Why? This paper presents a model based on an explanation that has received increased attention in the last decade: technological progress. Medical advances allow diseases to be cured today, at a cost, that could not be cured at any price in the past. When this technological progress is combined with a Medicarelike transfer program to pay the health expenses of the elderly, the model is able to reproduce the basic facts of recent U.S. experience, including the large increase in the health expenditure share, a rise in life expectancy, and an increase in the size of health-related transfer payments as a share of GDP.
FIGURE 1. OECD Health Expenditures as a Share of GDP
Source: OECD (2000), Table 16 .
INTRODUCTION
In 1960, aggregate health expenditures in the United States were 5.1 percent of GDP; by 1997, the health expenditure share stood at 13.6 percent.
Why have health expenditures as a share of GDP risen so dramatically?
One conventional explanation holds that U.S. government policy is responsible. Changes in transfer programs such as Medicare and Medicaid have possibly led to the increased spending on health. One problem with this explanation, however, is that similar increases in health expenditures as a share of GDP have been observed throughout the OECD, as shown in
Figures 1 and 2. It is true, as is often noted, that the United States spends a larger fraction of its income on health than other countries, but the recent tendency for this expenditure ratio to increase seems to be a widespread phenomenon. The typical change across the OECD is an increase in the health expenditure share from about 4 percent of GDP to about 8 percent.
Another possible explanation is the cost disease story of Baumol (1967) .
According to this explanation, health care, like other services, uses labor intensively and exhibits relatively low productivity growth. This leads to a rising relative price of health care and, depending on preferences, to a rising share of expenditures. Superficially, this argument appears somewhat plausible, as measured labor productivity growth in the health sector was negative between 1987 and 1997 and the medical care component of the CPI grew faster than the overall CPI (Triplett and Bosworth (2000) ). On the other hand, the general cost disease explanation for health care rings hollow in the face of rapid technological advances such as the discovery of new drugs, diagnostic equipment, and medical procedures that appear to be occurring throughout the health sector. Moreover, it is clear that measurement problems in this sector are severe, and attempts to correct these measurement problems support the casual observation that medical care is a sector with rapid technological change. As just one example, Cutler, McClellan, Newhouse and Remler (1998) report that between 1983 and 1994, the real quality-adjusted price of heart attack treatments actually declined at an annual rate of 1.1 percent. 1 Newhouse (1992) provides a nice survey of possible explanations for the rise in health expenditures as a share of GDP. In addition to changes in U.S. policy and the Baumol cost-disease story, Newhouse considers and rejects explanations driven by demographic changes associated with the aging of the population, the increase in health insurance, increased income and health as a luxury good, and supplier-induced demand for medical care.
For example, on the demographic explanation, Newhouse concludes that the aging of the U.S. population can account for a rise in total expenditures of merely 15 percent between 1950 and 1987, a small fraction of the more than five-fold increase in actual expenditures. As another example, the income effects explanation is problematic in large part because estimates of the income elasticity of demand for medical care in the United States, holding insurance constant, are only about 0.2 to 0.4. After reviewing in detail these possible explanations, Newhouse finds that he is left with a large residual: even taken together, these explanations account for only a minority of the increase in health expenditures, certainly less than half and perhaps less than a quarter. Instead, Newhouse argues that "I believe the bulk of the residual increase is attributable to technological change, or what might loosely be called the march of science and the increased capabilities of medicine" (p. 11). This explanation has received growing attention throughout the last decade from health economists; a small list of examples include Fuchs (1996) , Okunade and Murthy (2002) , and Cutler (2004) . This paper constructs a simple model to examine the effects of the "march of science" on health expenditures. Technological advances allow diseases and other health problems that could not be cured at any price in the past to be treated effectively today. Consider the development of MRIs, arthroscopic medical procedures, antibiotics, angioplasty, and drugs that treat depression. Before these and other technologies were discovered, health expenditure shares were low by default. The gradual discovery of new treatments over time directly increases the expenditure share by permitting the desired health expenditures to occur.
Of course, a countervailing force is that technological progress continually reduces the cost of any given treatment, as in the heart attack example given above. MRIs and heart attack treatments -once adjusted for quality -are much cheaper today than a decade ago. How these two forms of technological progress ultimately influence aggregate health expenditures is something this paper will explore.
Another important component of the model is a Medicare-like transfer program. As modeled, this program features an endogenous tax rate that adjusts to ensure that the elderly live as long as is technologically feasible.
This transfer system and technological progress turn out to be a powerful combination. Unchecked, this combination produces a rapidly growing health share that can eventually consume an arbitrarily large fraction of GDP. A critical parameter of the model then turns out to be the maximum transfer rate that society is willing to tolerate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model, while Section 3 adds the transfer program. Section 4 shows that the model, for plausible parameter values, is consistent with the Newhouse view that the march of science accounts for the majority of the increase in the aggregate spending share. Section 5 provides a fully worked-out simulation of the model for a particular parameterization. Section 6 presents some additional evidence on the validity of the model, and Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
BASIC ACCOUNTING IN A SIMPLE MODEL
In this section we present a very stylized model meant to capture some of the facts related to health expenditures. The model can be thought of as "Solow and Romer meet health economics." As in Solow (1956) , economic allocations and technological progress are taken to be exogenous so as to simplify the analysis. As in Romer (1990) , technical change is at the heart of the paper.
Microfoundations
Suppose there are a range of health problems that can afflict a person. These problems are indexed by x ∈ [0, ∞) and are ordered so that health problems with a higher x are scientifically more difficult to treat. At any point in time, successful treatments have been discovered only for health problems in the range [0,x(t)].
Let (x, t) denote life expectancy for someone successfully treated for condition x at time t. In modern actuarial tables, life expectancy has a statistical meaning, different from the number of years a typical person might expect to live, which depends on future technological progress. To avoid making assumptions about the future, life expectancy is calculated as the expected length of life for a person born today and forever facing the mortality rates that prevail in the cross-section of ages today. With one change, we will give a similar interpretation to . The change is that measures the expected length of life assuming all technologically-available treatments are utilized. In fact, as we will see, some technologies may be so expensive that they will not be utilized and people will die who, at some cost, could live longer. We assume that (x, t) is given by
Life expectancy is higher for less severe conditions, but falls to zero for someone who contracts the most severe health problem that can be treated,
In the absence of a treatment for any health problem, a person dies. Once a treatment is discovered, the cost of treating condition x is
where δ(x) denotes the date at which a successful treatment for condition x is first discovered. The cost of treating a disease when the treatment is first discovered increases at rate β with the severity of the disease. However, after the initial treatment is discovered, subsequent technological progress continually reduces the cost of treating the disease at rate γ. In the model, then, technological progress affects health expenditures in two different ways. The march of science leads to the discovery of costly treatments for health problems that could previously not be cured, but it also reduces the cost of those treatments over time.
We model both kinds of technological progress as exogenous and assume that the date at which the first successful treatment for condition x is discovered is given by
wherex 0 represents the frontier of medical knowledge at time t = 0. Every α years, the march of science shifts this frontier out by one unit.
Some useful implications
We now derive the distribution of health expenditures across people as a function of life expectancy, and we then derive the time series process for economy-wide life expectancy. These derivations are particularly useful when it comes time to match the model up with data.
Some straightforward algebra shows that 2
where
and
Equation (4) has the following interpretation. At a given level of life expectancy, health expenditures rise over time at rate µ ≡ β/α. As the presence of the parameter β in this expression makes clear, this increase reflects the fact that people at a given level of life expectancy suffer from more severe -and therefore more costly -medical problems over time. by the recent work of Seshamani and Gray (2004) .
A more straightforward implication of the model relates to economywide life expectancy. The highest life expectancy in the population is given by (0, t) =x(t) =x 0 + t/α, where the last equality comes from setting t = δ(x(t)) in equation (3). This corresponds nicely to what demographers calculate as life expectancy at birth, and it will be useful to give this quantity its own variable name,ā(t):
Because of technological progress, economy-wide life expectancy rises by 1 year every α years. White (2002) shows that this linear formulation provides an excellent fit of the data in high-income countries in the second half of the twentieth century with α approximately equal to 5. See Lee (2003) for more discussion of this regularity.
Remaining setup
The remaining setup of the model involves the distribution of the population, timing considerations, and a description of income. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the population is uniformly distributed across life expectancy at each point in time, with ∈ [ * (t),ā(t)]. 4 The endogenous variable * (t) will be equal to zero if all available technologies are utilized. It will be greater than zero to the extent that some technologies are not used. For example, suppose that * = 2 at some time. In this case, people die when they, if all treatments were used, could live for two additional years. This might be an outcome if those additional treatments are extraordinarily expensive. We will define
This can be thought of as actual life expectancy at birth in the population at time t, and, since the population is uniformly distributed across , it denotes the size (measure) of the population at time t. Note that the assumption that the population remains uniformly distributed across while life expectancy is growing means that there is population growth.
The timing of the model works as follows. Time is discrete. At the beginning of a period, people undertake their health expenditures, and then live for that period. People whose life expectancies in period t are in the range [ * (t), * (t) + 1) die at the end of that period.
Finally, let Y (t) denote aggregate income at time t so that y(t) ≡ Y (t)/a * (t) is per capita income. We assume y(t) = y 0 e gt so that per capita income grows exogenously at the constant rate g. At this point, we
do not need to make any assumptions about the distribution of this income across people.
Preferences and quality of life
The model considered here does not explicitly introduce utility functions or quality of life considerations. However, both of these elements are in the background and it is worth pausing to comment on their roles.
First, one could imagine incorporating an explicit utility function into the analysis, which determines the amount that gets spent on health care, subject to the constraints of the technology. The assumption here is that the technology constraints are always binding: people would like to spend more on health care and to live longer and better lives, but the technology
does not yet exist, so they are constrained to spend what is feasible at any point in time.
Second, clearly a substantial amount of health spending affects quality of life in addition to quantity of life, and in practice it is very difficult to divide spending into these categories. The key equation regarding spending in the model is equation (4), which says that spending rises as life expectancy declines in the cross-section, and the entire profile shifts up over time. While the microfoundations do not explicitly introduce quality of life considerations, one could interpret this equation as also incorprating spending that affect quality: h( , t) gives the amount of spending required at a given life expectancy at a given point in time that allows the person to live an additional year at a particular quality level.
Analysis
With this setup, we are ready to solve for aggregate health expenditure as a share of GDP. First notice that total health expenditure, H(t), is given by
Dividing by GDP and recalling that Y (t) = a * (t)y(t) yields
That is, the aggregate expenditure share is the average of the individual expenditure shares. 5
Using equation (4), it is straightforward to show that
The first line of this expression exploits a simple fact that the integral of an exponential process is proportional to the difference between its value at the two endpoints. 6 The second line takes advantage of the fact that this difference is proportional to the expenditure share by the person closest to death.
Finally, as long as θa * (t) is relatively large, a very good approximation is given by
There are several things to note about this result. First, the aggregate health expenditure share is proportional to the largest quantity of health 5 Notice that we are abusing the language a bit with this statement. Because we've made no assumptions about the distribution of income, the correct statement would be that the aggregate share is a weighted average of the individual expenditure shares, where the weights correspond to income shares. That is, we could multiply and divide the term inside the integral by y( , t). Rather than proceed in this way, it is convenient to leave the expression as h( , t)/y(t). We will speak of this as the health expenditure share by someone with life expectancy , but the income-weight caveat should be kept in mind.
6 A more intuitive way to view this mathematical fact is to consider the average of an exponential process rather than the sum. If
The exponential growth rate is equal to the percentage change in the process, where the change is taken relative to, not the starting or ending value, but to the exponential average itself.
expenditures in the population divided by per capita GDP. Let us call this term, h( * , t)/y(t), the health expenditure share at the end of life, because it reflects the health expenditures of individuals with the minimal level of life expectancy. It is slightly misleading to call it an expenditure share because it is per capita income in the denominator rather than any individual's income.
Still, it is convenient to have a short phrase to describe this quantity.
Second, the factor of proportionality depends inversely on life expectancy, a * (t). Holding constant the expenditure share of people near death, an increase in economy-wide life expectancy reduces the aggregate expenditure share. We will call this the dilution effect. Recall that the aggregate spending share is the average of the individual spending shares. A higher level of life expectancy, with the highest expenditure share held constant, essentially means a larger measure of low-cost healthy people over which we are averaging. At any point in time, there are always five years worth of people who are five years away from dying. This is true whether economy-wide life expectancy is 60 years or 80 years, but in the latter case, these five years worth of people constitute a smaller fraction of the population.
Third, because of this dilution effect, growth in the aggregate expenditure share requires the expenditure share at the end of life to grow faster than life expectancy. Using equation (4), we can replace this expenditure share with the appropriate exponential terms to get
A necessary condition for H/Y to grow is that µ > g, i.e. that health expenditures at a given level of life expectancy grow faster than per capita GDP.
Finally, we can use the approximation in equation (14) to get a rough sense of the numbers involved. As discussed in the introduction, between 1960 and 1997, the U.S. health expenditure share rose from 5.1 percent to 13.6 percent, that is by a factor of 13.6/5.1 = 2.7. Similarly, life expectancy over this period rose from 66.6 years to 73.9 year, or by a factor of 73.9/66.6 = 1.11, according to the data in Figure 2 . To match these numbers, the expenditure share at the end of life must rise by a factor of 2.7 × 1.11 = 3.0. Assuming * is constant and g = .018, this requires a value of µ = .047. That is, health expenditures by people shortly before they die must have been rising at a rate of 4.7 percent per year.
By itself, this result is not surprising -it is simply a matter of accounting.
If H/Y has been rising and if health expenditures are distributed exponentially across the population, then the health expenditure share at the end of life must have been rising, and we have simply calculated the rate at which this rise must occur. 
PAY-AS-YOU-GO HEALTH CARE FINANCING
To this point, we have suppressed any budget constraint considerations in the determination of health expenditures. This neglect is now remedied.
The individual expenditure decision is impacted significantly by public and private health insurance and by life cycle considerations. Rather than analyze this complicated choice, we make a number of special assumptions about the economics of individual decision-making. The goal is to build a
model that is simple to analyze yet sophisticated enough to produce interesting results.
At some point, individuals approach the end of life and face large health expenses. We assume that these expenses are financed in the following way.
First, individuals near the end of life have income and wealth that allows them to spend up to some multiple, σ, of disposable per capita income on health care. For simplicity, the level of this resource constraint is assumed to be the same across people. The parameter σ is a reduced-form way to capture several competing concerns. On the one hand, individuals may have access to health insurance, discussed below, so that they only need to pay some fraction of their health expenses, leaving more resources for consumption and bequests. This suggests that σ might be low. On the other hand, individuals know that they will face large health expenses near the end of life and may save for this purpose. This would make σ high.
Clearly, σ could be greater or less than one, and in a richer model would not be invariant to the policy regime: changes in the health care system would change σ. Modeling these sophisticated effects is important. However, it is also complicated, and the results that one obtains are likely to be sensitive to the exact nature of private and public health insurance and to behavioral assumptions. We leave this valuable research to future work and instead focus on the simpler case where σ is a reduced-form parameter, with these caveats kept in mind.
In addition to their own resources, individuals in this model have access to a basic health insurance system. We will think of this as public health insurance, but there is no reason in the model why it could not be run privately. The insurance scheme is financed by a flat income tax (premium)
at rate τ (t). It pays out benefits, v( , t), that depend on health status.
Because of rapid technological progress, the cost of keeping people alive in the last year of life rises more rapidly than per capita income (µ > g). At some point, these costs outstrip an individual's ability to pay for treatments, so that even though the technology exists to prolong life, the cost is greater than the individual can afford. Call the date at which this occurs t * , and notice that this date solves the following equation
Prior to date t * , individuals can pay their own health expenses, and we will assume the insurance scheme does not operate, so that τ (t) = 0 for t < t * . Up until this date, aggregate health expenses are determined by equation (13) with * (t) = 0. That is, people live as long as is technologically possible.
After date t * , this changes. The technological costs of keeping individuals alive as long as possible may exceed their resources. In the absence of a transfer scheme, such people would die immediately.
Transfers v( , t) are paid to these people in exactly the quantity needed to keep them alive until the budget is exhausted. That is
where¯ (t) denotes the life expectancy of the marginal person requiring a transfer, given implicitly by
Finally, we assume that the transfer program operates with a balanced budget:
We make the following additional assumptions about the insurance institution. After date t * , transfer payments are used to keep people alive as long as is technologically feasible. That is, equation (18) can be thought of as determining the insurance premium τ (t) so that * (t) = 0. We also assume that this premium/tax rate is capped atτ < 1. In general, there will be a third date t * * at which time this bound on the tax rate is binding. In this regime, equation (18) can be thought of as determining * (t) so that the budget constraint is satisfied with τ (t) =τ . That is, life expectancy is rationed by the willingness of society to pay the large health expenses of those near death.
We pause at this point to highlight the key endogenous variables and the key equations that determine them. These variables are h( , t),ā(t), a * (t), * (t),¯ (t), H(t)/Y (t), and τ (t). The equations that determine these endogenous values are (4), (7), (8), (17), (18), (13), and the conditions described above that set τ (t) = 0 when t ≤ t * , * (t) = 0 for t ≤ t * * , and τ (t) =τ when t > t * * . Notice that t * is determined by equation (15) and t * * is determined as the date at which τ (t * * ) =τ and * (t * * ) = 0 in equation (18).
SIMULATING THE MODEL, PART I
The survey by Newhouse (1992) suggested that the "march of science"
was responsible for at least 50 to 75 percent of the rise in U.S. health expenditures. Now that we have a model in which technological progress can lead to a rising health share, the question is whether or not the magnitude of the increase is quantitatively significant for plausible parameterizations. Picking a value for θ gives us the opportunity to examine two different pieces of data. Recall that θ captures the rate at which health expenditures decline with life expectancy in a cross-section of the population.
Miller (2001) Figure 3 . While the model assumes this relation to be log-linear, the data suggest that it is not. Rather, a log-linear spline seems to fit the data better. Medicare expenditures rise at a rate of 9.4 percent per year for people 3 to 10 years away from death. This rate then accelerates sharply to 45 percent per year in the last two years before death.
7 Since the data correspond to Medicare expenditures over time for people who died in a single year, one might worry that Figure 3 reveals µ + θ rather than just θ. Footnote 3 in Miller (2001) documents that the expenditures are placed in 1990 dollars by multiplying by a factor corresponding to per capita Medicare expenditures in the two years. This essentially undoes the µ effect. In terms of the model, it introduces an extra term corresponding to the proportion by which life expectancy changed between the two years, but this factor is extremely small relative to the θ effects, so I have chosen to report the original Miller data rather than making the correction. Table 1 .
This suggests a value of θ in the model that is some average of 0.094 and 0.45. 8
Fortunately, θ can also be calculated using a second piece of data. It is straightforward to show (see the Appendix) that the fraction of total health expenditures accounted for by people in the last year of life is approximately equal to 1 − e −θ ≈ θ. Intuitively, this occurs because the distribution of health expenditures across people is exponential with parameter θ, and this entire distribution shifts in the same way over time. Lubitz and Riley (1993) This is what we do now.
For this purpose, the key insight comes from equation (6), which we reproduce here:
Recall that θ measures the rate at which health expenditures change in the cross section with a change in life expectancy. Health expenditures are higher for a person with lower life expectancy for two reasons. First, the health problems possessed by this person are more severe, raising costs at rate µ. Second, basic treatments for these more severe problems have been discovered more recently, meaning that the cost-reducing technological progress occuring at rate γ has had less time to operate.
If we knew the value of γ, equation ( While a CPI-like price index increased at an annual rate of 9.2 percent over this period, their alternative price index, only partially incorporating quality improvements, grew only 4.1 percent per year, falling relative to the total CPI at a rate of about 1.5 percent per year. Berndt, Bir, Busch, Frank and Normand (2000) estimate that the price of treating incidents of acute phase major depression declined in nominal terms by between 1.7 percent and 2.1 percent per year between 1991 and 1996, corresponding to a real rate of decline of more than 3 percent (though over a relatively short time period). 10 An important consideration in picking the range for the treatment price declines is that there is also a bias in the total CPI index. The papers considered above attempt to measure the bias in the treatment price index, but to the extent that the total CPI inflation rate is biased upwards, the real price declines implied by those studies may be overstated. This is why we limit the upper end of the range to two percent. 
Finally, "Frac. Expl." reports that fraction of the actual increase in H/Y explained by the model, equal to ("H/Y F actor"−1)/(2.67 − 1), where 13.6/5.1 = 2.67 is the actual factor increase in the U.S. data between 1960 and 1997.
The results in Table 1 suggest that it is quite plausible that the "march of science" accounts for a substantial amount of the increase in health expenditures as a share of GDP. Without more accurate estimates of θ and the rate at which treatment prices decline, it is difficult to be precise about the exact explanatory power of the model. Nevertheless, across a wide range of parameter values the fraction is substantial. The main exception seems to be if, simultaneously, θ is small and treatment prices decline very rapidly.
SIMULATING THE MODEL, PART II
The results from the previous section suggest that advances in medical technologies can account for a substantial fraction of the increase in the aggregate health expenditure share. In this section, we pick specific parameter values for µ and θ and simulate the model over time to examine its predictions along other dimensions. In particular, we choose µ = 0.0473 and θ = 0.2877. The choice of µ means that the model will match exactly the increase in the U.S. health expenditure share. The choice of θ means that one quarter of health expenditures go for people in the last year of life.
For completeness, the implied value of γ given these choices is −0.0094, so that quality-adjusted treatment prices decline at a rate of about 1 percent per year. As should be clear from the previous discussion, there is no reason to think these parameter values are exactly correct, and one should not read too much into the exact quantitative predictions they imply.
A couple of other parameters need to be calibrated in order to simulate the full model. The parameter σ captures in a reduced-form fashion the individual's budget constraint limit on health expenditures. We assume,
arbitrarily, that σ = 1/2 so that individuals can spend no more than one half of per capita income on health. Many of the results below do not involve this parameter at all. The exception is in determining the level of transfer payments, where the sensitivity is direct and obvious: for any given aggregate level of spending, a higher value of σ will reduce the amount of transfers required to support that level of spending. Table 2 .
Several results from the simulation deserve mention. First, the aggregate health expenditure share grows rapidly until τ (t) =τ , here set (arbitrarily) to 10 percent. As long as * = 0, that is as long as all technologies are utilized, the exponentially rising cost of the frontier technology causes the aggregate health share to increase. Mathematically, this result is already familiar from equation (14) Third,τ reflects the maximum level of resources that this economy is willing to transfer from healthy people to sick people. In practice,τ is the outcome of a very complicated political economy problem, and it could change over time as the political calculus changes. However, following our basic approach in this model, we treat this political outcome parametrically.
What one sees from the simulation is that once this political constraint is binding, the dynamics of H/Y change drastically. Before the constraint binds, the aggregate health expenditure share grows rapidly as society transfers an increasing fraction of resources from the healthy to the sick. Once this source of additional funding is exhausted -which in this simulation happens in the year 2004 -the rise in H/Y comes to a halt and in fact the aggregate health share begins a slow, steady decline. The source of this decline was apparent back in equation (14): if growth in the expenditure share at the end of life is halted (or at least slowed considerably), the dilution effect takes over. Because of technological progress, the rise in life expectancy means that the population consists of an increasing fraction of healthy people. In the simulation in Figure 4 , this dilution effect dominates after theτ constraint is hit. H/Y declines, asymptoting to the value given byτ itself, since by construction society is always spending at least this much of its income on health.
But if the individuals near death are always spending σ(1 − τ )y of their own resources on health, why does the aggregate share asymptote toτ ?
The answer is suggested by the "Fraction Subsidized" column in Table 2 .
In particular, notice that the fraction of the population benefitting from the subsidy first rises and then declines after theτ constraint becomes binding. That is, the full amount of the subsidy becomes increasingly concentrated within the population after the constraint is met, so that health expenditures financed by the resources of these people shrinks to zero. A political economy implication of this result is that it may be difficult to sustain a positive value ofτ in the long run.
The policy parameterτ obviously plays a key role in the simulation results. If it were set higher, the rapid growth of H/Y would continue longer. And if it were set lower, H/Y would peak sooner.
There is a sense in which the "multiplier" associated with a change inτ is large. Figure 5 examines the consequences of cuttingτ in half, from .10 to .05, starting from the beginning of the simulation. In this case, the constraint that τ (t) <τ starts to bind in 1989 rather than in 2004, and the aggregate health expenditure share peaks in that year at 10.8 percent, or 5.8 percent aboveτ . Notice that this is less than the gap whenτ = .10, which equals 16.3-10=6.3 percent: the transfer rate is associated with a multiplier that is greater than one. The intuition for this result is that transfer payments increase the number of people near death, and these people themselves spend some of their own resources on health. As one would expect, a higher value of σ will increase this multiplier.
The substantial reduction in health expenditures as a share of GDP associated with the lower transfer rate ofτ = .05 has a relatively small effect on life expectancy, as can be seen in the lower panel of Table 2 . In the 12 Other related calculations on the gains from the increase in life expectancy can be found in Murphy and Topel (2003) and Nordhaus (2003) .
13 See Technical Review Panel on the Medicare Trustees Reports (2000).
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
We now turn to other pieces of evidence that can be used to assess the success of the model, the first of which involves health-related transfer payments. The aggregate health expenditure share starts to decline when the economy hits the constraint on transfers,τ . Interestingly, U.S. federal and state health expenditures as a share of GDP show a pattern not unlike that of τ (t) in the simulation. In 1960, this share was 1.3 percent. It rose steadily over time before peaking in 1995 at 6.3 percent and declining slightly to 6.1 percent in 1998. 14 As shown in Figure Combining this theory of the effects of technological change with a transfer program that allows health expenditures at the end of life to rise to four times per capita income produces a framework that is broadly consistent with the following stylized facts:
1. Medicare expenditures rise sharply as life expectancy declines in a cross section, at a rate of about 10 percent until life expectancy falls to 3 15 More generally, differences in public health, nutrition, diet, and economic growth may help to explain some of the differences in life expectancy gains across countries. For example, both Japan and Norway had similar changes in health expenditure shares, but remarkably different changes in life expectancy. This could be related to the fact that over the period 1960 to 1992, Japan was one of the world's fastest growing countries, and to the nutritional gains that were associated with this growth. Simulations using the model suggest that a critical determinant of health expenditures as a share of GDP is the willingness of society to transfer resources to people near the end of life. As long as this willingness is unconstrained, the health share in the model rises rapidly. On the other hand, once a cap on these transfers is reached, the model predicts a halt to the rising health share and even a slow, gradual decline to a long-run level corresponding to the transfer rate. The source of this decline is a "dilution effect" associated with rising life expectancy. There are always five years worth of people with life expectancies of five years or less. As life expectancy rises, the fraction of the population accounted for by these people declines. If the expenditure share of these high-cost people is kept from growing too rapidly, the increasing fraction of low-cost healthy people reduces the aggregate expenditure share.
The model clearly has a number of serious limitations. Most obviously, it treats in a reduced-form fashion a number of key parameters, including α, µ, θ, σ, andτ . A productive avenue for future research is to examine the microfoundations that determine these parameter values. Such a study would be forced to confront the important but complicated effects of health insurance, the relation between life expectancy and technological progress, and the political economy of health-related transfer payments, not to mention the interactions between these phenomena. As just one interesting example, Weisbrod (1991) From equation (14), this relation can be rewritten as
Health expenditures in the last year of life as a share of GDP are proportional to H/Y at rate 1 − e −θ ≈ θ. This factor, in turn, is then the fraction of total health expenditures associated with people in the last year of life.
